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DO WE BUY MORE OR LESS WHEN WE WANT TO LEARN? 





Cross-border acquisitions may be a primary mode for accessing novel 
knowledge and the building up of knowledge capabilities. However, the 
successful exploration of novel business and/or location knowledge may 
require specific structural forms for the incorporation and internal transfer to 
occur. In this paper we examine the relationship between the knowledge 
strategy and the structural form of the acquisition, specifically the degree of 
equity acquired. Our analyses of 439 US cross-border acquisitions revealed a 
curvilinear effect of location-related knowledge exploration but a linear effect 
of business-related knowledge exploration on the structural form of cross-
border acquisition. We conclude that the knowledge strategy, and perhaps the 
type of knowledge being sought, is related in complex manners to the 
structural form adopted. 
 
Keywords: cross-border acquisitions, knowledge strategy, equity ownership, 
structural forms, learning 
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INTRODUCTION 
The volume and magnitude of cross-border acquisition over the past 
decade has led some authors to refer to this "CEO favorite growth strategy" 
(Hitt, Ireland & Harrison, 2001, p. 384) as a merger mania. According to 
recent United Nations reports the volume of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) 
accounts for about 80% of the foreign direct investment (FDI) flows (UNCTAD, 
2000). Cross-border acquisitions have surpassed alternative entry modes as 
the vehicle through which multinational corporations (MNCs) exercise their 
internationalization strategies (Zollo, 1998).  
Academic research has accompanied the growth in the volume and value 
of acquisitions, notably cross-border acquisitions. However, it has mostly 
relegated the study of cross-border acquisitions to comparisons with 
alternative entry modes, such as greenfield startups and joint ventures (Li & 
Guisinger, 1991; Hennart & Park, 1993; Woodcock et al., 1994; Barkema & 
Vermeulen, 1998) in the analysis of the determinants of the governance forms 
in foreign expansion. Moreover, extant studies tend to place acquisitions in an 
undifferentiated group rather than considering the possibility of different 
strategic motivations underlying the choice of alternative cross-border 
acquisitions' structures. These studies do not distinguish the share of equity 
ownership involved in the acquisition, placing together full and partial 
acquisitions. However, it is probable that acquisitions may be structured 
differently for different purposes, and do not require a comparison among 
alternative entry modes.  
Cross-border acquisitions have been examined as attempts either to 
leverage existing resources in new industries or host countries (Caves, 1971; 
Buckley & Casson, 1976; Rugman, 1981) or, more recently, as attempts to  
- 4 - 
explore novel technologies and knowledge (Hedlund & Ridderstrale, 1997; 
Morosini, Shane & Singh, 1998; Karim & Mitchell, 2000; Vermeulen & 
Barkema, 2001). While exploitation involves using current resources in new 
operations, such as operations in host countries, exploration involves 
accessing novel knowledge, developing new resources, information, and 
capabilities. These resources and knowledge reside beyond the firms' 
immediate business or geographic landscapes and may therefore help to 
explain international expansion as a global exploration strategy. The 
expansion into foreign countries contributes to the building up of MNCs’ 
knowledge capabilities (see Tallman & Fladmoe-Lindquist, 2002) and increases 
the likelihood that a diversified pool of experiences will endow the 
multinationals with the next generation knowledge. The characteristics of the 
knowledge sought determine the extent to which location (and hence FDI), 
and share of ownership (and hence acquisition, in whole or in part) of a 
foreign subsidiary are important for exploring (learning) or exploiting 
(marketing) purposes. Therefore, the specific strategy of the MNC to exploit 
and/or explore knowledge across borders may influence a variety of entry 
decisions such as the degree of equity ownership acquired, the extent of 
integration or autonomy conferred to the subsidiary, and the business and the 
location entered.  
However, to the best of our knowledge, no other study has assessed the 
degree of equity ownership in cross-border acquisitions as a reflection of the 
MNCs' knowledge strategy. The overarching research question for this study 
is:  What is the impact of the MNC's knowledge strategy for each deal - 
exploiting or exploring for distinct knowledge types - on the ownership 
structure of cross-border acquisitions? The degree of equity ownership is  
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important because varying degrees of ownership entail equally varying levels 
of control, integration, inter-firm collaboration, resource commitment, 
irreversibility of strategic actions, access to resources, and exposure to 
industry and country risks and uncertainties. It is further probable that the 
degree of equity impacts on the reported potential loss of resources of the 
target firm post acquisition (Dyer, Kale & Singh, 2004). Further, we 
differentiate MNCs’ exploration for business and location knowledge and 
hypothesize on the relationships between the knowledge strategy pursued and 
the structural form of the deal (in this paper empirically simplified to the 
degree of equity ownership) in US cross-border acquisitions. Our empirical 
analyses of 439 cross-border acquisitions revealed a curvilinear effect of 
location-related knowledge exploration but a linear effect of business-related 
knowledge exploration, on the ownership structure of cross-border 
acquisitions. Hence, as we suggested, the relationship between the knowledge 
strategy, and perhaps the type of knowledge being sought related in complex 
manners to the structural form adopted. 
Below, we develop the theoretical foundations and the hypotheses. Then, 
we present the methodology used to test the hypotheses, sample and 
variables. The results of the empirical tests follow. The paper concludes with a 
discussion, implications for theory and practice, and avenues for future 
research. 
THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
Cross-border acquisitions are a form of governance of transactions, in 
which the focal acquirer MNC expands its internal boundaries by internalizing 
activities that were previously executed by the target firm. A cross-border 
acquisition occurs when one firm (the acquirer MNC) acquires part or the  
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totality of the equity of another firm (the target firm) in a foreign country. 
Contrary to a merger, where both firms are absolutely integrated, acquisitions 
per se do not represent a model of organizational integration; rather, the 
degree of equity acquired confers on the acquirer MNC a continuum of control 
options and possibly of levels of integration of the resources of the target firm 
(McGahan & Villalonga, 2004).  
Extant research has somewhat confounded ownership with entry mode. 
The typical aggregations on shared and whole ownership are often used 
indistinctly of the entry mode. Similarly, the usual classifications of entry 
modes do not distinguish the degree of ownership involved. Although there is 
arguably value of using, for example, insights from joint venture research for 
the study of partial acquisitions, or from greenfield startups for full 
acquisitions, it is evident these modes are substantially distinct. Our study is a 
within entry mode examination, rather than between alternative modes, 
allowing us to distinguish MNCs' strategies for specific events, or deals, and 
how different MNCs' strategies may lead to one or the other structural choice 
in terms of equity ownership in cross-border acquisitions. 
Degree of Ownership 
While a majority of the existing studies tend to assume that cross-border 
acquisitions refer to full acquisitions, an acquisition may actually involve any 
equity stake from 1 to 100%. For example, a full acquisition (i.e., the 
acquisition of 100% of the target firm's equity) provides the acquirer complete 
control over the target's resources, and a minority acquisition (i.e., the 
acquisition of less than 50% of the target firm's equity) provides at most 
partial control, or partial ability to influence the operations of the target. 
Different degrees of ownership involve varying levels of financial resource  
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commitments, degrees of independence and autonomy in decision making, 
exposure to political, economic, social and business risk, and also different 
levels of learning. The extant research has often conceptualized the degree of 
equity ownership as representative of the level of integration or control of the 
subsidiary. However, the ownership stake is not a direct equivalent to the 
degree of control exercised or the extent of integration. Although control 
requires some degree of ownership, ownership may not be exercised in 
controlling. Moreover, for instance, lower ownership generally entails lower 
control and less integration or more autonomy, but it is likely to favor the 
access to the target's resources, as we will propose. Ownership and 
integration are somewhat different sets of decisions. 
The degree of equity ownership is a structural complementary alternative 
to the degree of autonomy conferred to the target firm post-acquisition as 
suggested by Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991). That is, when the target 
possesses valuable resources for the acquirer, the acquirer may prefer to 
confer a higher degree of autonomy to the new subsidiary (Haspeslagh & 
Jemison, 1991), or to acquire only a partial equity stake in the target. Acquirer 
MNCs may prefer lower ownership modes to absorb efficiently the target firm's 
skills, routines, technologies, and organization culture to avoid the loss of the 
target's value, employees and clients after the acquisition (Dyer et al., 2004). 
Conversely, MNCs prefer higher ownership modes to transfer headquarters' 
knowledge resources, competitive advantages, skills, routines, and ways of 
doing things to the subsidiary. At least to some extent, full acquisitions are 
more likely to involve lower post-acquisition integration hazards (Barkema & 
Vermeulen, 1998; Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001) than partial acquisitions 
because in a full acquisition the acquirer is essentially seeking to transfer its  
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resources and capabilities to the target firm. In this regard, full acquisitions 
are modes for the exploitation of firm-specific advantages. In other words, full 
acquisitions may be preferred mechanisms to exploit capabilities held, rather 
than explore new knowledge.  
The degree of equity ownership is also a strategic alternative to what 
Hayward (1999) termed "small acquisition mistakes" and to Sitkin's (1992) 
"small losses." According to Hayward, MNCs could start by acquiring small 
firms to learn. As they develop knowledge of the target business and location, 
higher commitment modes could then be employed more safely (Johanson & 
Vahlne, 1990). Brown and Eisenhardt (1998) also suggested that because of 
the uncertainties involved in entering unfamiliar territories (i.e., uncertainties 
in explorative learning), MNCs may scan the future using initially low cost 
probes and formulate their next strategic moves accordingly, suggesting that 
partial equity stakes in acquisitions could resemble low cost probes. 
Furthermore, small equity positions on the target may find parallelism on a 
real options model of foreign expansion. 
The resource- and knowledge-based views suggest a positive impact of 
the target's resources on the level of integration such that the higher the value 
of these resources the higher the incentive to fully integrate them. The 
target's resources may be combined with other resources/knowledge already 
held by the acquirer to promote value creation, operational and managerial 
synergies (Datta & Grant, 1999). However, several issues need consideration. 
First, higher integration does not guarantee internal transfer. Second, higher 
integration may disrupt the value of the target's resources. Third, some 
resources are highly embedded and indivisible from the firm and cannot be 
efficiently integrated (Hennart, 1988; Mitchell, 1994; Anand & Delios, 1997).  
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These resources are strongly linked to the relationship between the firm and 
the host country, and cannot be acquired in disembodied form in the factor 
market (Barney, 1991) or accessible by fully integrating the target firm. 
Fourth, some resources need to be accessed directly in the location where 
they exist. Fifth, by acquiring a partial ownership stake, the acquirer also 
minimizes a variety of country risks and reduces locational uncertainty 
(Tallman, 1992), while it gradually accumulates host country and industry 
knowledge (e.g., about the market, institutional environment, distribution 
systems). Hence, it seems reasonable to suggest that the higher the value of 
the target's resources, the more likely the acquirer will avoid full integration, 
opting instead for conferring a higher degree of autonomy to the target firm 
(Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991) in one solution, or in another solution, by 
taking only a partial equity stake in the target firm. By engaging in a partial 
acquisition the acquirer preserves the value of the acquired resources 
(Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Zollo, 1998), avoiding disruptions in the system 
of routines and procedures of the target firm.  
Different governance models, or structural forms, are possibly more 
appropriate for some types of knowledge. For example, Hennart (1988) noted 
that licensing is more appropriate for the transfer of explicit knowledge but 
closer interaction through equity modes may be more appropriate to access 
and  absorb novel knowledge (Killing, 1980). Some acquisitions may require at 
least a degree of internalization while others may require total integration. For 
example, MNCs pursuing a knowledge seeking, or knowledge exploration, 
strategy may need to acquire part of the equity of a target due to 
imperfections in the market for knowledge (Teece, 1981; Hennart, 1982). In 
other instances, diverse structural arrangements may be required for different  
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types of knowledge sought. For instance, Hennart (1988) noted that link joint 
ventures are often used to combine different types of knowledge, and that 
pooled joint ventures are used to combine similar types of knowledge. Hence, 
even for similar types of knowledge, equity relationships may be more efficient 
than either market based exchanges (e.g., licensing) or fully integrated 
governance models (e.g., full acquisition). In particular, imperfections in the 
market for knowledge seem to emerge primarily from evaluation uncertainties, 
ineffectiveness in the system for protection of proprietary knowledge 
resources (e.g., patents), and the tacitness of some forms of knowledge.  
To conclude this section, our discussion supports the argument that the 
degree of equity ownership acquired should reflect either the interest of the 
acquirer MNC in the target's resources or the transferability of the acquirer's 
resources and (knowledge-based) capabilities to additional operations. Each of 
these motivations will differentially drive the acquisition of different shares of 
equity of the target firm. That is, the ownership structure should reflect, and 
differentiate, the motives and strategies underlying cross-border acquisitions. 
Using a knowledge-based strategy perspective we show how the ownership 
structures can be used to increase the effectiveness of the MNCs' knowledge 
strategy in cross-border acquisitions.  
Knowledge Strategy 
The strategy of the firm consists of the goals and objectives that lead to 
the allocation of firm's resources (Chandler, 1962) and addresses many 
aspects of the firms' behaviors. In this study we focus on knowledge 
strategies. Knowledge strategies address the extent to which a focal deal is 
knowledge explorative. In international management studies the knowledge 
strategies have often been defined as market seeking (i.e., exploitation) and  
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strategic asset seeking (i.e., exploration) strategies (Dunning, 1993; Dunning 
& Narula, 1996). The relation between strategy and structure was evidenced 
in various studies, most notably by Chandler's SCP, and is outside the 
immediate focus here, but the degree of equity acquired is one of the 
structural features to consider in the implementation of acquisitions. 
The MNCs may augment their knowledge- experiential-based capabilities 
through global exploration strategies (Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001; Tallman & 
Fladmoe-Lindquist, 2002) by entering different technological (i.e., 
businesses/industries) and/or geographic environments (i.e., countries) 
(Karim & Mitchell, 2000). Cross-border acquisitions ease the combination of 
MNCs' in-house existing knowledge with novel knowledge acquired from 
external partners. Following Reuer et al. (2004), "novelty" refers to the extent 
to which a focal deal involves accessing knowledge that departs from prior 
held knowledge. Hence, a deal may be novel both in terms of accessing 
knowledge at the level of the business (e.g., product-related knowledge, or 
technological capabilities applied to production) and/or novel in terms of 
accessing a location in which the acquirer MNC is not yet present.  
The MNCs may pursue different knowledge strategies simultaneously for 
different deals (March, 1991). The characteristics of the deal, rather than 
those of the MNCs, are a more accurate manifestation of the primary 
knowledge benefits and knowledge strategy of the MNCs for the foreign deal - 
i.e., the extent to which each deal represents higher or lower knowledge 
exploration. Hence, the knowledge strategy of the acquirer MNC for each deal 
is appropriately assessed in terms of the knowledge that may be accessed and 
how, and how much, this knowledge departs from the MNCs' current pool of 
knowledge. The acquirer MNCs' knowledge strategy for a focal cross-border  
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acquisition may influence the structural form adopted and specifically the 
degree of equity ownership acquired. To the extent that the knowledge 
strategy of the acquirer MNC differs, so may structural choices governing the 
acquisition.  
Exploring for Business Knowledge 
The MNCs will be accessing novel business-related knowledge when 
diversifying into new industries; industries that requires different knowledge 
skills and whose knowledge requirements differ from those already known 
(Coff, 1999). The extent to which each deal serves exploration purposes is 
partly driven by the applicability of the MNC-specific capabilities outside the 
MNC's traditional core business and into more unrelated businesses. In other 
words, the relative knowledge novelty of a business entered is determined by 
the MNC's prior business experiences. Hence, the evaluation of the acquirer's 
business exploration strategy may be formulated from the knowledge 
requirements, skills, or features of the acquirer and target firms industries 
(Chang, 1996; Coff, 1999; Reuer & Ragozzino, 2004). Coff (1999), for 
example, suggested that the closer the knowledge requirements of the target 
and acquirer firms' industries, the more familiar the acquirer will be with the 
target's resources, buyers and suppliers, management capabilities, and so 
forth, and the acquirer MNC will be better able to evaluate whether its current 
resources may be synergistically combined with the resources of the target. 
Reuer et al. (2004, p. 22) recently suggested that "[i]n its primary business, 
the MNC is better able to value potential targets because it is more familiar 
with pertinent technologies, employee skills, and other resources" because 
"the two firms will tend to have greater similarities in business practices and 
organizational routines than is the case in inter-industry transaction," thus  
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mitigating the risks of poor evaluation of the target. Therefore, the more 
proximate (or related) the businesses of the acquirer and target, the more 
similar will be the assets of the two firms, thus causing fewer integration 
hazards (Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 1991; Harzing, 2001), and more potential 
for synergies (Chatterjee, 1986, 1990).  
In accord to received theory, resource-rich MNCs are traditionally 
assumed to exploit their business knowledge held, perhaps leveraged in 
combination with the resources of the target, by expanding into similar 
business- or product-related businesses through wholly-owned modes. Wholly-
owned modes better protect the value of the MNCs' resources. Similarly, it is 
likely that the primary motivation underlying the MNCs' business-related 
cross-border acquisitions is the exploitation of the MNC's capabilities. 
According to Capron, Dussauge and Mitchell (1998), in absolutely related 
acquisitions, most technical resource transfers are from the acquirer to the 
target. Anand and Singh (1997) and Capron et al. (1998) noted that firms’ 
resource redeployments post-acquisition will be higher the more similar are 
the target and acquirer firms. These transfers from the acquirer MNC to the 
target are probably mostly transfers of business knowledge, which are to be 
subsequently exploited in the host market. 
The higher the business knowledge relatedness of the new focal deal with 
the MNCs' business knowledge held, the higher the likelihood that a focal MNC 
will seek to obtain a larger equity stake in the target that grants control over 
its operations. Conversely, when the knowledge requirements and skills of the 
target and acquirer industries vary considerably (i.e., business unrelated 
acquisitions), there are larger information asymmetries regarding the target's 
resource base. Acquisitions in non-core, and more unrelated, business areas  
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are more likely to face evaluation hazards because the acquirer MNC "will be 
less familiar with targets and less knowledgeable about the value of their 
underlying resources" (Reuer et al., 2004, p. 22). Moreover, the more distinct 
are these businesses the more likely the acquirer will misevaluate the 
transferability of the target's resources, and the synergistic potential of these 
resources when combined to the acquirer's resources. Several scholars have 
found empirical evidence that MNCs' entering novel businesses prefer 
acquisitions to greenfields (e.g., Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998; Caves & Mehra, 
1986; Hennart & Park, 1993) because acquisitions underlie a learning 
rationale whereby the acquirer MNC seeks to capture manufacturing, 
management or commercialization capabilities from the target firm. Hence, 
the selection of the target firm is more hazardous for cross-border acquisitions 
in non-core and unrelated businesses than in the core and related businesses, 
as suggested previously. A structural form based on shared equity may be 
particularly advisable in these cases. In other words, the lower the business-
related knowledge distance provided by the acquisition the closer to a 
knowledge exploitation strategy, conversely, the larger the knowledge 
distance between acquirer and target the higher the knowledge exploration. 
The above rationale suggests a linear effect of knowledge exploration and 
equity stake, such that the lower the exploration the higher the equity stake. 
A competing hypothesis is warranted, however, because it is possible that 
an MNC entering a business with which it is absolutely unfamiliar (in which it 
had no previous experience) it may opt for acquiring the totality of the target 
firm. The internal governance of these subsidiaries has to be substantially 
distinct. For example, an exploitation strategy is likely to require the 
absorption and integration of the target firm to take advantage of scale and  
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scope economies, and internal transfers. Conversely, an exploration strategy, 
as evidenced in an absolutely business-unrelated acquisition, is likely to 
require conceding a great degree of autonomy to the foreign subsidiary (Datta 
& Grant, 1999; Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001). In this case it seems probable 
that the target is not really integrated into the overall MNC, but rather that it 
is managed independently. Acquisitions in unrelated businesses may be 
particularly hazardous (Singh & Montgomery, 1987) because the dominant 
logic is very different across businesses (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986), suggesting 
that acquisitions in unrelated spaces may be given high autonomy. Morosini et 
al. (1998) also noted that high levels of cultural distance between firms may 
lead to cultural ambiguities and process losses where cultures collide and may 
lead to conflict (Jemison & Sitkin, 1986). Appropriate structural forms can 
prevent conflicts from emerging by, for example, keeping cultures apart. 
Hence, it is in these cases where ownership and integration become more 
distinct.  
MNCs are less likely to integrate knowledge from highly different and 
autonomous subsidiaries (Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001). These autonomous 
subsidiaries may have idiosyncratic knowledge mandates, or may simply be 
outposts into radically new areas of business (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1998; 
Birkinshaw, 1997). Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) focused specifically on 
post-acquisition implementation and highlighted the tension between the 
strategic interdependence of the acquirer and target firms and the need to 
provide autonomy to the target firm for effective knowledge transfer. They 
noted that while strategic interdependence requires integration to maximize 
the potential synergies, knowledge transfer, or resource sharing, the need for 
autonomy emerges when the acquirer is unfamiliar with the target's resources,  
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markets, and technologies. This rationale suggests a possible curvilinear effect 
of the knowledge strategy with the equity stake. Hence, we formulate two 
competing hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1.1. The greater the business knowledge exploration (novelty) in 
a cross-border acquisition, the lower the share of equity ownership acquired. 
Hypothesis 1.2. The effect of business knowledge exploration on the share of 
equity acquired is U-shaped, such that the MNC will acquire a larger share of 
the equity of the target firm for both high and low levels of business 
knowledge exploration and a lower share of the equity for intermediate levels 
of business exploration. 
Exploring for Location Knowledge 
The MNCs also acquire firms in different locations, not only in different 
businesses. A significant body of research on industry clusters, for example, 
has highlighted the benefits from accessing location-specific knowledge that is 
often "in the air" (Marshall, 1920; Shaver, 1998; Tallman et al., 2004). 
Location-specific knowledge is developed idiosyncratically in each country as a 
result of education policy, orientation towards science and R&D, culture, 
innovation system (Kobrin, 1991; Kogut, 1991; Cantwell & Janne, 1999), 
political, legal, economic and social profiles. Some locations are particularly 
interesting learning sites due to their idiosyncratic technological trajectories, 
knowledge bases, institutions, national culture, social and cultural 
development, pattern of government intervention, demand and supply 
conditions and inter-firm rivalry that provide them a comparative advantage 
(Porter, 1990). By entering a new country, MNCs are building their location-
related knowledge.  
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The farther the locations are from the MNCs' prior geographical 
experiences, the more likely these represent a greatest deviation from the 
current knowledge portfolio, and the higher the opportunity for learning. 
Location-specific knowledge is built through years of education of the 
population, general governmental expenditures in education, government 
R&D, host country firm's investments in R&D. All these materialize the 
knowledge that may be sought after by foreign investors, but also make part 
of the architectural knowledge that characterize and distinguish locations 
(Tallman et al., 2004). Location knowledge is also bound by the national 
culture. For example, different levels of power distance (Hofstede, 1980) may 
underlie different models of organization of labor and the preference for more 
or less hierarchical structures, and different levels of uncertainty avoidance 
may entail different levels of entrepreneurial activity. We may thus consider 
that also cultural distance (Kogut & Singh, 1988) between home and host 
country - to the extent that it highlights countries' dissimilarities - is an 
indicator of whether the acquirer MNC will be accessing knowledge that 
departs more radically from the current stock of knowledge (Rosenkopf & 
Nerkar, 2001).   
Location-related knowledge exploration strategies are executed by 
entering new locations; that is, MNCs access novel location-related knowledge 
when expanding to countries where they are not yet present. Some locations', 
or countries', endowments are location-specific and not transferable away 
from the location (Anand & Delios, 1997). As Anand and Kogut (1997) put it, 
not all resources and knowledge are fungible across borders. The 
transferability, or lack of it, not only justifies cross-border acquisitions because 
they facilitate the "procurement of host country knowledge, resources and  
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capabilities" (Anand & Delios, 1997, p. 581), but also requires the selection of 
t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  f o r m  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  guarantee access to, and absorption of, 
these knowledge/resources. Cross-border acquisitions seem to be the most 
appropriate mode to span boundaries and access location-specific knowledge. 
That is because mere co-location may not suffice for learning, and foreign 
firms may instead be required to become embedded on the inter-firm 
relationships in the local network of firms and institutions (Saxenian, 1994). 
Collaborative approaches, such as shared equity ownership arrangements 
(e.g., partial acquisitions, alliances), speed knowledge acquisition and reduce 
technological uncertainty by relying on the absorption of the knowledge held 
by the partner firms (Mowery, Oxley & Silverman, 1996; Powell et al., 1996). 
Hence, when the goal is to learn from the location, the MNC is likely to take 
only a partial equity stake on the target firm. 
However, similarly to the rationale presented for business knowledge 
exploration, it is reasonable to suggest a curvilinear relation between the 
knowledge strategy and the structural form. Briefly, we advance that at very 
high levels of location exploration it may be better to fully acquire a target 
firm. When the location knowledge departs too radically from the knowledge 
pool held, the acquirer MNC has little to none absorptive capacity - the current 
knowledge does not permit the assessment or commercial application of the 
knowledge accessed. Hence, in those instances where the location is 
absolutely unfamiliar, the best may be to fully acquire the target, perhaps 
providing it with complete autonomy (Datta & Grant, 1999) so as not to 
disrupt the value of the knowledge and because any attempts to integration 
would be largely counterproductive. Acquisitions in very unrelated locations 
may be risky (Singh & Montgomery, 1987) and be governed by a different way  
- 19 - 
of doing things (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986). The subsidiaries in distant locations 
may be kept autonomous and empowered with specific knowledge mandates 
(Birkinshaw, 1997). Morosini et al. (1998) also noted that high levels of 
cultural distance between firms may lead to cultural ambiguities and process 
losses where cultures collide and may lead to conflict. The need for autonomy 
of these subsidiaries emerges because the acquirer is completely unfamiliar 
with the target location. In other words, intermediate levels of location 
exploration that make use of some capabilities of the MNC but also seek to 
access some degree of novel knowledge are likely to call for varying levels of 
shared equity positions. Hence, some similarities, or relatedness, between 
acquirer and target firms create potential for synergies and learning (Capron, 
1999) but possibly only if they are not so great as to prevent future inter 
subsidiary transfer. We formulate two competing hypotheses on the 
relationship between location-related knowledge exploration and equity 
ownership: 
Hypothesis 2.1. The greater the location knowledge exploration in a cross-
border acquisition, the lower the share of equity ownership acquired. 
Hypothesis 2.2. The effect of location knowledge exploration on the equity 
acquired is U-shaped such that the MNC will acquire a larger share of the 
equity of the target firm for both high and low levels of location knowledge 




We retrieved the data on cross-border acquisitions from the SDC Platinum 
database and restricted the criteria as follows. First, we included only  
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completed and unconditional
1 cross-border acquisitions that were executed in 
the year 2000 by US firms. Maintaining the year constant, we avoid potential 
year effects that could confound the analyses. We selected the year 2000 
because since in 2000 there were a large number of acquisitions that yield an 
appropriate sample size. Restricting the cross-border acquisitions to only US 
acquirers allowed us to maintain constant the country of origin of the acquirer, 
thus also avoiding possible inter-country variations. These variations may exist 
but are not our focus here. Second, we excluded financial services firms (e.g., 
banks) since these operate with a different set of principles and their reporting 
standards are substantially different from those of manufacturing and other 
service firms. We further included only publicly held acquirer firms since data 
on private firms are virtually non existent
2. Third, we excluded acquisitions in 
offshore financial havens, such as the Virgin Islands and Bermudas because it 
is likely that the acquisitions in financial offshores seek only taxation or 
accounting benefits. Fourth, we retrieved only the first acquisition in a focal 
target firm. In other words, we do not include sequential acquisitions. Hence, 
we excluded the acquisitions where the acquirer is reinforcing the equity stake 
in a given target firm.  
I t  i s  w o r t h  m e n t i o n i n g  t h a t  t h e  o b j e c t  o f  a n a l y s e s  i s  t h e  f o c a l  c r o s s -
border acquisition, but the historical data refer to the acquirer ultimate parent 
and not necessarily to the focal acquirer. With this procedure we build a more 
comprehensive representation of the MNCs' capabilities that may or may not 
be used in cross-border acquisitions. That is, for each acquisition we tracked 
down the acquirer ultimate parent, and it alone may account for some 
                                                 
1 The inclusion of unconditional acquisitions captures different reporting system of Australia.  
2 We allowed private target firms to stay in our sample because the data on foreign target firms 
are largely not accessible for either public or private target firms.  
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differences we found compared to other studies previously carried out on 
cross-border acquisitions. For example, the firms in our sample seem to have 
a larger international experience and acquisition capability than those in Reuer 
et al. (2004). We believe that a better depiction of the MNCs' capabilities 
requires that we look at the acquirer's ultimate parent rather than the acquirer 
per se, because predictably the capabilities accumulate at the level of the 
overall firm, not simply at the level of a focal acquirer unit. The focal acquirer 
may be the headquarters, a subsidiary in the U.S., or a subsidiary in a foreign 
country (either the focal target country or any other foreign country).  
  The final sample comprises 439 cross-border acquisitions
3 by 231 U.S. 
MNCs. Of these, roughly about 30% involved the acquisition of less than the 
total (or full) equity of the target firm. Specifically, 83 acquisitions (19%) were 
minority acquisitions and 49 (11%) were majority acquisitions. Not 
surprisingly, we observed that a large proportion of the acquisitions occurred 
to the United Kingdom (19%), Canada (12%), Germany (7.5%) and Australia 
and Brazil (5%). 
Measures 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable assesses the degree of equity ownership acquired 
in a focal cross-border acquisition. In this study we coded the equity stake into 
a variable with a binary outcome: full versus non-full.
4 The degree of equity 
                                                 
3 The target countries included in our sample were: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Brunei, Canada, Chile,  China, Colombia, Czech Rep., Denmark,  Finland, France, 
Germany, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Morocco, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russian 
Federation, Singapore, Slovak Republic, South Africa,  South Korea, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, Venezuela, Vietnam. 
4 We also coded the equity stake into full (100% of the equity), majority (>100% and <50%) 
and minority (>50%). This classification was used in conducting statistical tests with a 
multinomial logit model. Since the results of the majority and minority equity stake did not 
seem to differ drastically and in a meaningful way, we opted for conducting a logit model. 
Notwithstanding, note that the majority of the acquisitions are full acquisitions, and hence the  
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ownership acquired was extracted from the SDC database. The classification of 
equity in a dichotomous outcome was due to two issues: first, the SDC 
database often does not specify the actual percentage of equity acquired and 
rather just indicates whether it was a minority, majority or full stake; second, 
the categorical outcome permits a clearer identification of the final ownership 
control status by the acquiring MNC.  
Independent variables 
Two variables assessed the MNCs' knowledge exploration strategy. These 
variables were used in prior studies. To assess the exploration for location-
related knowledge we used the Kogut and Singh's (1988) well-known measure 
of cultural distance between the home and host country. We defined each host 
location according to its cultural novelty (Reuer, Park & Zollo, 2002) in much 
the same way as in Kogut and Singh and using Hofstede’s (1980) four 
dimensions of culture (power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism 
and masculinity). Location novelty was proxied by the cultural distance 




















where Iij is the score for scale i for the host country of the target firm j, 
Iif is the score for scale i for the host country of the focal acquisition f, and Si
2 
is the sample variance in scale i. Location knowledge is not restricted to 
cultural aspects but there is abundant research noting how other dimensions 
of a country environment correlate with culture (see Morosini et al., 1998), 
such as entrepreneurial culture (McGrath et al., 1992), innovation (Shane, 
1993), orientation towards research and development, new product 
                                                                                                                                                    
understanding of when do MNCs engage in less than a full acquisition seems particularly 
important.  
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development and innovation (Kogut & Singh, 1988; Shane, 1993), propensity 
towards assuming risks (Hosftede, 1980, 2001). As Morosini et al. (1998:) 
noted "[g]iven the uncertainty as to the routines and repertoires that will be 
valuable in the future, an MNE may increase the probability of possessing 
greater variety of potentially valuable routines and repertoires by acquiring 
firms in culturally dissimilar countries." 
To assess the exploration for business-related knowledge involved in an 
acquisition we used a measure of the knowledge distance between the 
acquirer and target firm main businesses. This measure was drawn from 
Chang (1996), Farjoun (1998) and Coff (1999) and was recently employed in 
M&A research (Reuer et al., 2002). Prior studies on corporate diversification 
have used this measure to gauge the knowledge base of a firm or to compare 
the knowledge requirements of home and destination industries for expanding 
firms (Farjoun, 1998; Chang & Singh, 1999). This variable measures the 
Euclidian distance between two industries (at the 3-digits SIC) based on their 
knowledge requirements - proxied by their respective employment 
distributions across divisions. Data for the calculation of this variable were 
obtained from the Occupation Employment Survey (OES) from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, which provides data on the distribution of employment across 
224 occupational categories within industries at the 3-digit SIC level. The 
formula reads as follows: 
5 . 0 22
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where EAk and ETk are the proportions of the workers in occupation k in 
the acquirer's and the target's industries respectively. In this study we 
restricted the 224 possible employment categories to the main 22 employment  
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categories. The more dissimilar the two industries, the higher will be the 
business knowledge novelty between the acquirer and target's primary 
business, and hence higher knowledge exploration. Reuer et al. (2002) in a 
study of international joint ventures (IJVs) suggested that more novel IJVs 
tended to be more exploratory in nature, while conversely more familiar IJVs 
would likely had a significant exploitation component to them (Koza & Lewin, 
1998; March, 1991).  
Control variables 
To account for possible alternative explanations, we included several 
control variables, as follows. We controlled for the acquirer's slack financial 
resources. We adopted an identical procedure to Reuer and Ragozzino (2004) 
measuring the acquirer firms' financial leverage as the ratio of the acquirer's 
total liabilities to total assets.
5 Firms with a larger financial slack can more 
easily engage in the acquisition of a larger equity stake. However, we would 
expect the impact of slack to be particularly strong for an acquirer pursuing an 
exploitation strategy, and less strong for acquirers pursuing an exploration 
strategy. Moreover, slack resources are a good indicator of the ability to 
replicate in a foreign country the operations in the home country - an 
exploitation strategy. Notwithstanding, while it may be reasonable to suggest 
that slack would facilitate "going alone" experimentations, it is less likely to 
occur through acquisition, and would be more likely to occur through 
greenfield sole ventures. Data were obtained from Compustat. 
We also controlled for the MNC’s foreign acquisition experience as 
measured by the number of countries where the firm has already conducted 
acquisitions, in the period 1989 to 1999. We used the number of countries of 
                                                 
5 We tested alternative formulations of the acquirer financial leverage, such as using the ratio of total 
liabilities over total equity (cfr. Reuer et al., 2004) and the results were virtually identical.  
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foreign acquisitions, rather than the number of foreign acquisitions, to 
measure experience because the former offers a more accurate description of 
the firm’s capabilities of implementing acquisition under different countries 
business environment contexts. Nevertheless, we also tested with the number 
of prior acquisitions (count and log) and the results were not altered.  
We also controlled for the target firms' characteristics. We proxied the 
target firm size by the number of SIC codes the target firm held. The data did 
not allow more direct measures such as number of employees or asset value, 
but tests in a small sample showed a correlation of over 60% between the 
number of SIC codes and firm size - which seems reasonable since more 
diversified firms are generally larger. Larger targets could make more difficult 
a full acquisition. Finally, we controlled for the target firms' technology. We 
measured the high technology by the number of high tech codes held by the 
target firm. Data collected from SDC. 
RESULTS 
Since our dependent variable has a dichotomous outcome, we used three 
logistic regression models to analyze and test the hypotheses. The descriptive 
statistics (table 1) and the regression results (table 2) are shown below. Model 
1 includes only the control variables. Model 2 also includes the linear terms of 
business and location knowledge exploration - needed to carry out the tests 
with the curvilinear effects. Model 3 is the complete model. 
[ Insert Table 1 & Table 2 about here ] 
Hypothesis 1.1 proposed a negative linear association between the extent 
of business-related knowledge exploration and the likelihood the degree of 
equity acquired. Hypotheses 1.2 formulated a competing test that the 
association could be curvilinear. The results on the relationship between  
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business knowledge exploration and the likelihood of full acquisition confirm 
hypothesis 1.1 since the coefficient on the Business knowledge exploration is 
negative and statistically significant (beta = -0.032, p<0.05 in Model 3). 
However, the coefficient on its square term is only marginally significant at 
10% level (beta = 0.001, p<0.10 in Model 3). Therefore, Hypothesis 1.1 is 
confirmed but not Hypothesis 1.2. Hence, we conclude a linear association 
between business knowledge exploration and the degree of equity.  
Hypotheses 2.1 and 2.2 advanced competing alternatives on the 
association between location-related knowledge exploration and the degree of 
equity ownership. Our tests strongly support both hypotheses - a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient on Location knowledge exploration (beta = -
0.837, p<0.01 in Model 3) and a positive and statistically significant coefficient 
on its squared term (beta = 0.141, p<0.05 in Model 3). Therefore, we 
conclude that the relationship between a firm’s location knowledge exploration 
and the likelihood of fully acquiring a target firm (i.e, a full acquisition) is 
curvilinear. The MNC will acquire a larger share of the equity of the target firm 
for both high and low levels of location knowledge exploration and a lower 
share of the equity for intermediate levels of location knowledge exploration.  
DISCUSSION 
The MNCs' competitive advantage is determined by the ability to access 
new resources/knowledge and build their capabilities. The primary role of the 
firm is to identify these resources/knowledge, evaluate and exploit them, and 
explore additional combinations of resources/knowledge through strategy-
structure configurations to achieve a sustainable competitive advantage vis-à-
vis other firms.   
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Our study relates the knowledge strategy (the extent of business- and 
location-related knowledge exploration) to the structural form of the deal. We 
modeled the acquirer MNCs' strategies as the novelty of the business and 
location accessed in a focal cross-border acquisition. The drawbacks involving 
entries into novel deals are well known. These are, for instance, the post-
acquisition integration hazards, cultural clashes, loss of human resources, 
unused synergies, and so forth. However, these drawbacks are not preventing 
firms from engaging in acquisitions. At a simple, observational level, the 
majority of the cross-border acquisitions in our sample were not related at the 
4-, 3- or even 2-digit SIC codes to the MNCs' primary business, indicating that 
probably many of these deals are exploratory to, at least, some degree. 
  The results were robust in showing that the knowledge strategy does 
influence the structural form of the deal. However, the results are not 
straightforward. The largest the business knowledge exploration of the deal, 
the more likely the acquirer will take on a partial equity stake. Business 
similarity is a driver of exploitation and novelty of exploration. The results 
provide strong evidence for the effect of a location-related knowledge 
exploration on the structure of a cross-border acquisition. The higher the 
location exploration, the more likely the acquirer would take only a partial 
stake on the target firm's equity, but the relation between location exploration 
and equity is curvilinear (U-shaped). Most notably, acquisitions in highly novel 
locations may depart too much from the existing MNC's capabilities, and thus 
be managed as an autonomous subunit (Datta & Grant, 1990). Hence, for 
both low and high levels of location exploration the acquirer MNCs will be more 
likely to acquire the totality of the target firm. While this is an important 
result, its interpretation is complex. It is possible that underlying these two  
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extremes of location exploration are two completely dissimilar models of 
integration and control/autonomy of the foreign acquisition, as we theorized. 
Since we do not have direct data on the model of integration we may simply 
hypothesize that very distant acquisitions may be fully acquired but are 
managed quite autonomously. These acquisitions may entail a set of location 
routines that are completely outside the acquirer's capabilities, or absorptive 
capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), for an efficient full integration. In fact, 
these very distant acquisitions may be at the origin of Birkinshaw's (1997) 
view of subsidiaries as outposts to new knowledge, or to Brown and Eisenhardt 
(1998) probes into new landscapes. Hence, the MNC maintains the acquired 
firms autonomy thus better preserving its knowledge value. Conversely, 
proximate acquisitions are efficiently absorbed using the acquirer's existing 
capabilities. 
Implications for theory 
Our study contributes to research on learning theory and knowledge-
based models of foreign expansion; at the minimum to research on expansion 
through cross-border acquisitions. As learning- and knowledge-based models 
are gaining popularity among strategy and management scholars in recent 
years, little is still known on how strategies and structures come together to 
optimize learning (Huber, 1991). It seems straightforward that a primary 
condition for learning to occur is access to novel knowledge. However, firms 
also seem to learn directly and vicariously through observing other firms' 
experiences (Haunschild, 1993). Nevertheless, on a learning perspective we 
cannot discard the possibility that rather than acquiring a smaller equity stake 
on a target firm, the acquirer may instead acquire smaller targets to start with 
(Hayward, 1999), provide larger autonomy to the target (Haspeslagh &  
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Jemison, 1991), or use contractual forms to partially hedge from uncertainties 
(Reuer, Shenkar & Ragozzino, 2004). The data limited our ability to test 
Hayward's (1999) small acquisition mistakes hypothesis (see also Sitkin, 
1992). In this view, MNCs could pursue business and location exploration 
strategies by acquiring smaller target firms first.  
More importantly, this study contributes to a better understanding 
exploration strategies (or strategic asset seeking investments) by 
multinational corporations, and particularly it initiates an important debate: 
how should MNCs structure their participation in foreign markets to realize 
effectively a global exploration or exploitation strategy. Exploration strategies 
are motivated by the MNC's desire to gain access to resources, or the output 
of resources, which cannot be effectively transferred to the MNC through an 
arm's length transactions. Thus, we might expect that these resources would 
be difficult to transfer within the MNC as well. Hence, arranging for such 
transfers (see Zollo, 1998) is an essential part of a successful exploration 
strategy. It is possible that some of what we have learned in this study can be 
applied to general issues of MNCs' scope. It is easy to imagine situations in 
which an MNC could bring itself into contact with valuable public goods 
(location) which would be helpful in its core business by making investments 
in horizontally related industries. Even some decisions by MNCs to perform 
activities vertically related to their primary business can be motivated by an 
exploration led strategy. The simplest examples of this effect are investments 
in wholesaling and retailing by manufacturing firms. In some cases, these 
investments are clearly aimed at gaining knowledge about customer needs.   
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Implications for practice 
How much can managers learn from this study? Cross-border acquisitions 
are increasingly postulated as learning opportunities (Vermeulen & Barkema, 
2001), capable of redesigning the MNCs' entire repertoire of capabilities 
(Karim & Mitchell, 2000). Given the recurrent finding that acquisitions provide 
little or no financial benefits, the great benefit for firms may well be the 
learning potential of new businesses, new locations, and the applicability of 
their capabilities across the geographic and product space. 
Managers need to learn how to minimize the equity stake in uncertain 
cross-border acquisitions. If the purpose is to learn from the target firm the 
full acquisition of a target firm is already known to lead to a depletion of the 
target firm's resource value. For example, Dyer and colleagues (2004) 
documented the loss of human resources, clients and shareholders' wealth 
following an acquisition. Hambrick and Cannella (1993) focused specifically on 
the loss of executives post-acquisition. Dyer and colleagues assumed 
acquisitions to be full acquisitions. However, there is yet no evidence that 
there is a similar loss of value in a partial acquisition, as in fact, there is no 
empirical evidence that there is a loss of value following an equity joint 
venture. Hence, the structural form of the deal may be a good alternative to 
the degree of autonomy to the target firm (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991), or 
to the design of contracts (Reuer & Ragozzino, 2004) in conditions of 
uncertainty. Furthermore, by minimizing the equity stake acquired, managers 
free financial capital that may be used to explore in other spaces. 
  Managers also need to figure out that the potential for learning is 
determined by the novelty of the knowledge accessed. The mere 
replication of routines such as operating in certain countries and  
- 31 - 
businesses or engaging repeatedly in full acquisitions may not provide the 
variety of learning experiences required.  
Managers may use the structural form of the deal as a signaling device of 
the strategy. The extant research has overwhelmingly focused on the stock 
prices fluctuations and on acquisition performance, merely controlling (at best) 
for the degree of equity ownership, to suggest that unrelated acquisitions 
generally lead to poorer performance than related diversification. This 
observation may be actually a simplification of reality. It is possible that the 
stockholders cannot distinguish between exploiting and exploring strategies. 
Of course, an alternative is that stockholders simply do not value the added 
uncertainty emerging from exploration strategies. This has serious implications 
for management and for future implementation of acquisitions. 
Limitations 
A first set of limitations were imposed by the data and the need to resort 
to proxies to approximate theoretical constructs - which may be overcome in 
future studies with a dedicated survey. For instance, with dedicated primary 
data we could measure first hand the strategies pursued. To construct the 
knowledge strategy we assessed the novelty of the deal by comparing the 
main business, and location, of the acquirer and target firm. However, ideally, 
the business and location exploration would consider the entire pool of 
businesses and locations in which the MNC already operates. Furthermore, we 
did not focus on how much the acquirer MNCs learns but rather on what is the 
potential for learning given the novelty of the business and locations accessed. 
Although we considered, for simplification purposes, that expansions into 
related businesses and familiar locations would be essentially exploitative, it is 
possible that some of these expansions may bring some new knowledge. In  
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this manner when entering a foreign country but in the same business the 
MNC may still benefit from business knowledge inflows to the extent that the 
business knowledge evolved differently as a result of the country's 
technological and historical trajectories (Kogut, 1991). Similarly, when 
entering a familiar country but in a different business, there may be location 
knowledge benefits in that, for example, the institutional and economic 
context varies within the country for each industry. Hence, even entries to 
related areas may entail some knowledge benefits. Moreover, some unrelated 
acquisitions, contrary to my assumption, may be exploitative rather than 
explorative. These are cases where, for instance, a manufacturing MNC enters 
into distribution. Future research may expand on these interactive effects.  
The generalization of our findings to other nationalities needs to be 
cautious since we used a sample exclusively of US firms and there is evidence 
t h a t  f i r m s  f r o m  s o m e  c o u n t r i e s  t e n d  t o  e n g a g e  i n  l e s s  o f t e n  i n  f o r e i g n  
operations through wholly-owned modes (e.g., full acquisitions) and even less 
often in acquisitions. For instance, Japanese firms have a lower propensity to 
acquire and seem to prefer greenfield investments or shared equity foreign 
entry modes. 
CONCLUSION 
Cross-border acquisitions can be vehicles for the leveraging of the MNC's 
resources and capabilities but also for building new capabilities. Exploitation 
strategies can lead to competency traps. As the MNC expands more processes 
become governed by routines and the MNC becomes less responsive, or 
adaptive, to the new subsidiary's business and geographic idiosyncrasies. 
Vermeulen and Barkema (2001) referred to this as a process of simplification. 
Strategic rigidity emerges as routines and repertoires rigidify. As Morosini and  
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colleagues (1998, p.) noted "[r]outines and repertoires are ways in which a 
firm typically addresses aspects of organizing its business activities." Entering 
distant businesses and locations the MNC may revitalize its capabilities 
because it will be accessing different routines and repertoires (Barkema & 
Vermeulen, 1998) and learning (Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001). A knowledge 
exploration strategy will depart more radically from the MNC's capabilities but 
it is by entering uncharted territories that the MNC can reshape its own 
capabilities and contribute to develop a sustainable competitive advantage. 
Although the majority of the acquisitions continue to be full acquisitions, 
partial acquisitions may be a more appropriate mode when the goal is to 
explore unfamiliar landscapes.  
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TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Variable  Mean  S.D. Min  Max  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
1 Full  acquisition  0.70  0.46  0  1  1.00             
2  Location knowledge exploration  1.27  1.27  0.02  4.56  -0.20*  1.00           
3  Business knowledge exploration  2.46  1.73  0  4.47  -0.09*  0.02  1.00         
4  Acquirer firm leverage  0.67  0.27  0.02  3.07  0.02  0.06  0.06  1.00     
 
5 
Acquirer foreign acquisition 
experience 9.40  8.72  0  31  -0.12*  0.08  0.10*  0.31*  1.00   
 
6  Target firm size  1.96  1.39  1  18  -0.05  0.16*  0.14*  -0.02  -0.01  1.00   
7  Target firm high-technology  0.58  1.35  0  14  0.05  0.01  0.03  -0.11*  -0.03  0.19*  1.00 
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TABLE 2. Logistics Regression Models 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Location knowledge exploration  -  -0.326***  -0.837** 
Location knowledge exploration_Squared  -  -  0.141* 
Business knowledge exploration  -  -0.007
* -0.032* 
Business knowledge exploration_Squared  -  -  0.001
† 
Acquirer firm financial leverage  0.745  0.762  0.723 
Acquirer firm foreign acquisition experience  -0.036**  -0.031*  -0.030* 
Target firm size  -0.095  -0.032  -0.054 
Target firm high-technology (dummy)  0.120  0.117  0.100 
Intercept 0.823*  1.277**  1.741*** 
Log Likelihood  -263.09  -254.18  -250.77 
LR Chi2  10.67*  28.48***  35.30*** 
 
Note: 
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01 
 
  
 
 